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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CLARENCE M. STAMP,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,

Ij

Case No. 8463

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the
record. The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in the trial court.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant appeals from a judgment in the amount of
$10,000.00, rendered in favor of plaintiff in an action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The sole ground of appeal is excessive damages.
Defendant contends the damages were so excessive that
they appear to have been given under the influence of
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passion or prejudice, or in the 'alternative they were so
excessive that this Court should require a remittitur or
new trial.
The Statement of Facts presented by defendant on
liability fairly reflects the evidence introduced. No question is here raised on liability and we do not propose to
devote any time or space to that subject. We must assume that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
jury's findings that defendant was responsible to plaintiff for any damage he suffered as a result of its negligence.
\Ve do not believe that the Statement of Facts fairly
reflects the testimony on the question of damages. The
defendant seeks to belittle plaintiff's evidence on damage
and does not give due regard to the mental pain and
suffering which :\Ir. Stamp endured as a result of his injuries. A good example of defendants bias in reviewing
the evidence is found on Page 3 of ~lppellant's Brief
wherein it states :
"The doctor removed the bandage from his
left eye and asked him to read a chart, and he
claims he couldn't see the chart with his left eye."
Plaintiff testified he couldn't see the chart. This
is l'YidPnet\ in the case and the condition of his eye at that
tiine. It isn't 1nerely rlailned, it n1ust be considered here
as a fact established.
\ Ve wi II treat the testimony under Point I of this
BriPf.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I

"~ \:

THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
JURY WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
PASSION OR PREJUDICE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.

POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
JURY WAS NOT EX·CESSIVE AND DOES NOT APPEAR
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
PASSION OR PREJUDICE.

,,r.

,,

The elements of damage to which plaintiff was entitled were the loss of wages; mental pain .and suffering,
both past and future; physical pain and suffering, both
past and future; and loss of bodily function, both past
and future.
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The loss of wages in this case was not great, being
between $200.00 and $300.00. The bulk of the damages
suffered were the mental pain and suffering which plaintiff endured and that he may endure in the future and
also his physical pain. For a very good statement of
the elements of mental pain and suffering see Merrill v.
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 508, 111
Pac. 534, 538.
To most human beings sight is one of the greatest
blessings which has been afforded them to enjoy during
their lifetime. To take sight away from a person eliminates a goodly portion of his life and his ability to enjoy
life. To contemplate going through life without sight
would cause a feeling of horror and it certainly caused
:Jf r. Stan1p an exceptionally large amount of mental pain
and suffering. It is easy to look back from our present
vantage point and say but a few hours were spent by
plaintiff when he felt that horror. However, those hours
as :J[ r. Stan1p was going through them were hours compo~Pd of 1ninutes and seconds. \\Te should relive that
time with plaintiff. "\Ye do not believe that defendant
has properly set forth the experience of plaintiff resulting fr01n these injuries.
Plaintiff dropped the fusee into the flagging kit and
t hPn' wa~ an explosion. Plaintiff testified:

"\Ylwn this explosion occurred right at the
time, l just did not know exactly what had hapJH'JH'd, hut I couldn't see. So, I staggered back !o
whert> tlw lwneh was and sat down-half way la1d
dovm." (~8)
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This occurred about 10:00 A.M. (20)
Plaintiff further testified:
"The conductor, naturally, came right down,
because I had a handkerchief and was trying to
wipe my eyes out, and I started to remove pieces
of paper, I presume. There were quite large
pieces, and he asked me immediately what happened, and at the time, of course, I was so upset
I didn't know, only there had been an explosion.
He said, 'Are you-your handerchief-take your
hand down so I can see your face,' .and I did, and
he said, 'You look like hell,' and I put the handkerchief to my face again, and he was as worried
as I was. He said, 'I'll go over the top of the train
and get a track so they can take us in the yard.'
The reason for that was-ordinarily we will sometimes set at that switch for as high as an hour or
an hour and thirty minutes, and he didn't want
me out there that long. He started over the top.
He got up two cars, I suppose, .and he hadn't been
gone a minute or two, and the train started to
move, and he came back in the caboose. He said,
'Well, we are going in now.' Of course, all of
this time I was still digging at my eyes, and he
asked me if I could see, and I said, 'No, I can't
see,' and then there wasn't much either one of us
could say. The train stopped again, I remember,
and he said again, 'I am going over the top.'
Before he could get any distance they started
again and they did take us in the yard." (28,29)
The conductor, George E. Fuller, described plaintiff's face as follows:
"Q.

Could you describe it for us, please~

A. Well, his face resembled a man that would be
perspiring blood.
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Q. And, that was all over his face~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you observe his
A. Yes, sir.
Q.

eyes~

Could you describe those for us, please~

1\.. I could see particles in his eyes and blood
coming from his eyes.

Q. When you examined him there in the caboose,
did he appear to be in pain~
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And was that true all the time you were with
him~

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You were with him for how long a period of
time?
A.

Oh, I don't recall. I expect probably an hour.

Q. Did you accompany him as he went to the
various places to the depot, and up to the
doctor's office~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Did he require help?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did it look likely that he could see 1

A.

No, sir." (71)

Plaintiff also experienced trouble "ith his ears. He
t <'~t i t'i<>d <'Oncerning hi~ ears ilnn1ediately after the explosion:
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"Q. What about your ears at this time. What
effect did it have on your ears~
A.

My left ear was ringing from this explosion.
It caught me on the left side. I couldn't hear
out of my left ear at all. There was nothing·
but a roaring noise." (29)

After the conductor entered the caboose to help
plaintiff dismount, plaintiff described his condition as
follows:
"Q. Could you see at this time¥
A. No, sir, he took me off the caboose-! know
they did say, 'We will take him up on the
switch engine, but we will have to carry him
all that distance to the depot, which is a considerable distance.' They lead me to the
'carry-all', and placed me on it and went with
me, and the girl that drives the 'carry-all' for
the company drove directly to the doctor's
office. * * *

Q. Could you see in the doctor's office¥
A. No, sir.

Q. Go ahead and tell usA. And, there was some type of table they laid
me down on and I do know there were two
men in the office with me that happened to
be railroad officials. They started asking me
at that time what happened. I was in no
condition to tell anyone what had happened
after all." ( 30)
Concerning the examination and treatment of the
first doctor to examine him at Green River, plaintiff
testified:
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"A.

This first doctor, I know, raised my eye lid.
I could feel that, and then he called the other
doctor. I heard the other doctor ask for a
magnifying glass and then I felt him raise
one eye lid and he said, 'That is all. He will
have to go to a specialist. I won't fool with
his eyes five minutes.'

Q. Tell us whether or not you were worried at
this time in connection with your eyes.
A.

I certainly \vas. At that particular time,
which was a period there for approximately
thirty-forty-five minutes, I was in considerable pain. I had really no time to worry, except to know that I was in a helpless condition. I had to have someone lead me." (31)
Plaintiff was thereafter "led" to the Union Pacific
Club and waited there until the train left Green River for
Cheyenne (31). At approximately 12:30 P.1I. plaintiff
was put on the train destined for Cheyenne. The doctor
had prescribed drops to be placed in his eyes to kill the
pain .and the Assistant Superintendent placed these drops
in his eyes eYery hour (39). Concerning the condition of
his PYP~. so far as Yision was concerned, between Green
BiYPr and Rawlins he testified:

''Q. During this tune, could you see'
A.

Ont of 1ny right eye on the train I could distinguish the light of a match which was by
holding it up before my eye as though you
wPre to light a cigarette; that is all.

Q.

'Yhat about your left eye Y

A.

Nothing.'' (39)

Plaintiff's wife entrained with hin1 at Rawlins and
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accompanied him to Cheyenne. She continued to give him
the medication (39,40).
He arrived in Cheyenne at 6 :00 P.M. and the only
pain he was suffering was a burning sensation in the
corner of his left eye. He still couldn't hear out of his left
ear. He entered the :Memorial Hospital at 6 :20 P.M. and
s.aw Dr. Stump, an eye specialist (40). About the treatment administered to him at that time, he testified:
"Q.

Tell us what treatment he administered to
you~

A. Well, he must have arrived at the hospital
about 6 :45, and he removed particles from my
eye, but, of course, I couldn't see what he was
doing, but he did remove a great number of
particles from my eye at this time." ( 40)
Regarding his worries in the hospital, plaintiff tes:tified:
"Q. Were you thinking, or did you worry at all
about your eyes at this time~

A. I certainly did, yes, sir.

Q. Tell us about that worry.
A. Well, it's not a pleasant sensation to know
you can't see, and knowing whether you will
never be able to see again.

Q. Were you worried about that~
A.

I certainly was." (41)

He remained in the hospital from November 6th
until his discharge on the lOth. He testified that the bandages on his eyes were soaking wet and the nurse couhl
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not change them. He was uncomfortable the Saturday
night of his arrival because of the bandages and both
eyes were watering and running free. On Monday morning Dr. Stump came to the hospital and bandaged his
right eye and removed more particles (41). Plaintiff
then testified:

"Q. Could you see out of that at that time~
A.

I could see light, yes, sir, out of my right eye
at that time, and for that reason he left the,
patch off my right eye. I could see to get'
around the hospital, but left the patch on the
left eye.

Q. Tell us what vision you actually had Y Could
you distinguish objects and so on 7
A.

Out of my right eye I could distinguish objects enough to find my way around the hospital when I wanted to get up to go to the
bathroom." (-±1,-!2)

On Tuesday Inorning plaintiff was taken to the doctor's office. SeYeral particles in his eyes were very hard
to re1nove. One in particular gaYe the doctor a lot of
diffienlty ( -!::2). He testified concerning his sight at that
tilne:
.. A.

• • • Then is when he uncovered my left
PYe and asked 1ne to read a chart on the wall
tltat the Pye specialist used, but at that time
I eouldn 't even see the chart with my left eye.

Q.

.And, tell us how that made you feel Y

.A.

'rt'll, I was to send my wife home that day.
eouldn't staY awaY from the children any
longer, and being left 8lone-and at that time
~lw
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she said she was going to find a job, since
I wasn't going to be able to work again." ( 42)
On this occasion his left eye was still bandaged. On
the morning of the lOth, Dr. Stump came to the hospital
and asked plaintiff to go to his office. At the office the
doctor removed more particles and told him he could go
home for a week. Plaintiff had to return to the hospital
to check out (43). Concerning his mental condition .at
that time he testified:
"Q. Were you still worried about your eyes at
that time?

A. I was worried considerably, yes, sir." (43)
When he left on this occasion the doctor removed the
bandage from his left eye but advised him to wear dark
glasses to protect his eyes from the sun, which plaintiff
did (43,44). About his vision at that time, plaintiff
stated:
"Q.

Tell us about your vision at this time.

A. \Veil, my right eye seemed at that particular
time so that I could get around, and it didn't
seem to bother me at all. However, my left
eye gave me considerable concern. I kept my
wife quite bu~y with setting up, in particular,
a Post Toashes box on the table so I could
.attempt to read it to see if my eyes were gaining or losing strength. I made no effort whatsoever to read, and due to the fact I don't
think I could have, I didn't want to strain my
eyes. I wanted them to be in first-class condition." (44)
While at home this first week, plaintiff's eyes were
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continually draining and he had to keep changing pads.
He had to administer drops to his eyes. He returned to
Cheyenne on November 17th (44). On this occasion the
doctor released him to go to work. Concerning the treatment at this time, he testified:

"A. He wanted to take a look at one more particle
in my eye before I went home to see if it was
necessary to remove it. He spent possibly
as much as five minutes and did remove one
particle, or attempt to, I don't know that he
did out of my right eye." (45)
At the time plaintiff left the doctor's office, he wore
dark glasses and he was not capable of driving his automobile. Concerning his vision at that time, he testified:

"Q.

'Vhat can you tell us about your vision at
that time!

A. l\I' vision seemed to be all right as far as dis~ce was concerned, but when it came to

reading, the words seemed to run together."
(45)
~ i nee the explosion, plaintiff has worn dark glasses

to keep the sun fr01n his eyes. He has experienced headaehP~ :-;inee that time (41). He testified that he worried
about his eyes :

"Q.

During the period of time since you started
to work, han_~ you had any worries about your
eyP sightY

A.

I haYe worried about it constantly, yes, sir.

Q.

And, have you had any experience with for('ign bodies cOining out of your eyes!
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A. Yes, sir. OnQ. Tell us those.
A. New Years Day we were invited to watch television. I looked forward to it. I couldn't, I
had to leave, and a body was trying to wo.rk
out of my eye at that time, .and was qu1te
painful. That night it did come out as my
wife finally caught it on my eye lid and took
it out on a handkerchief. It was a crystal-like
object that reflected the light very sharp, and
then as late as last Friday, I was in Green
River and one was working out. ( 47)
Q.

How do they

feel~

A. Very much as Doctor Palmer described itas though you have an object in your eye.
You can't keep from blinking your eye. Your
eye runs constantly, which it did all that day.
However, I seem to be able to put my eye lid
down and press on it and this object seemed
to go back in my eye, .and relieve it for possibly a period of thirty minutes, and then it
would start again, and when I arrived home
Friday night from work, I asked my wife if
she could find it, but she was unable to detect
it. Saturday morning, as Dr. Palmer described it, seemed to have gone.
Q.

Have you experienced that same thing very
often during this year-this occurrence~

A.

Quite often, yes, sir.

Q.

And, has that caused you worry~

A.

It has to a certain extent, yes, sir." ( 48)

Plaintiff's wife tesii;ified that when she saw plaintiff
on the train November Gth, his face was flushed and there
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were cuts and particles of blood on his f.ace. Plaintiff's
eyes were continually running and he couldn't hold them
open very long. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that
prior to the explosion he had not had trouble with his
eyes or with headaches and he had not worn dark glasses
to any extent ( 45,47,65).
We submit that the foregoing testin1ony establishes
that there w.as an unusually large amount of mental pain
and suffering endured by plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff
also suffered physical pain.
Defendant in its brief contends that very early
within two hours after the explosion plaintiff knew he
had not lost the sight in his right eye and that ''-ithin
three days he knew he had not lost the sight of either eye.
Of course, under well established principle the evidence
must be viewed most f.avorably to plaintiff. The foregoing evidence shows that these contentions of defendan~
are not well founded.
That a person could distinguish that a match was
lighted when held close furnishes no knowledge that he
had not lost the sight of his eye. The evidence was to the
effect that he was worried about injuries to his eyes
right up until the time of trial. There were still particles
in his eyes as late .as September 23, 1955, the Friday before the trial (48). There is no foundation for saying
that plaintiff's worries were as short lived as defendant
contends.
liJxcessiveness of the verdict is the only foundation
for defendant's contention that the verdict resulted from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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passion and prejudice. In Ladder v. Western Pacific R.
Co., (Utah) 259 P. 2d 589, this Court pointed out:
"We also do not agree with defendants' contention that the amount of the verdict was so excessive as to require a holding as a matter of law
that the jury was actuated by passion and prejudice. We recently said that where the 'verdict is
so excessive as to show that it must have been
1notivated by prejudice or ill will * * * it should
be unconditionally set aside.' But we find no
case where this court has held that as a matter
of law passion and prejudice were shown merely
by the excessive amount of the verdict so we have
not indicated how great an amount or percentage
of reduction would be required to make such a
showing but we have approved reductions as high
as 50 per cent, and required a reduction of 70 per
cent of punitive damages, or about 63 per cent of
the total verdict. Here there was no other evidence of passion and prejudice. The trial judge
evidently concluded that the verdjct was not so
tainted. In Wheat v. Denver & R.G. W. R.R. Co.,
supra, we stressed that in case of doubt the deliberate action of the trial court should be followed. I-Iere the reduction was justified but there
was no other evidence of passion and prejudice."
This Court then listed the verdicts and percentage
of reduction and in no case was it found that passion
and prejudice were present where reductions had been
as high as 50% on general damages and 70% on punitive
damages. In the Lodder case the reduction was from
$25,000.00 to $10,000.00 a reduction of 60% and yet the
Court held there was no passion or prejudice as matter
of law.
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When excessiveness of the verdict was raised in the
United States Supreme Court, it stated in Affolder v.
N.Y.C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94 L.
Ed. 683:
"We agree * * * that the amount of damages
awarded * * * is not monstrous in the circumst,ances of this case."
The Federal Courts have held that passion and
prejudice of the jury will not be inferred from the mere
excessiveness of the award. Larsen v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co., 171 F. 2d 841.
The same situation exists here as in Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123, when this Court
stated:
"We can discover nothing in this case, except
the amount of the verdict, which indicates passion
or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and
prejudice are not necessarily inferred from an excessive verdict, 'vithout more. No exception was
taken to the jury or any member thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, evincing passion
and prejudice, has been called to our attention.
The only point of complaint is the size of verdict.''
Also in this case there is another event which has
been considered of great importance by appellate courts.
The trial court, who saw and heard plaintiff and the
other witnesses, has placed its stmnp of approval upon
this verdict. This was pointed out in the Lodder case.
Supra. This has been considered of importance in this
jurisdiction since at least 1916 when this Court in StephSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 48
Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, stated:
"Necessarily upon such a question appellate
courts must, to a large extent, rely upon the judgment and discretion of the trial court. That court
is in a much better position to observe and determine whether a jury was actuated by p.assion or
prejudice, or by both, in returning a verdict for
an amount larger than the evidence justifies, or
whether the jury was merely mistaken with regard to the amount that should have been allowed. The jury may merely have misjudged the evidence, or may have erred in their judgment respecting the amount that should be allowed, and
if such is the case the whole verdict is not tainted,
and the error may be cured by requiring the
plaintiff to remit the excess. To ihat effect are
all of the modern authorities. In Gila Valley,
G&N Ry. Co. v. Hall, 13 Ariz. 270, 112 Pac. 845,
what we deem to be the correct rule is stated by
the Supreme Court of Arizona in the fifth headnote, thus:
'Unless it clearly appears from the court
record that an excessive verdict in a personal·
injury action resulted from prejudice or passion rather than an undue liberality exercised
by the jury in awarding damages, the trial
court's action in remitting a part of the verdict instead of granting a new trial will not be
disturbed.' "
While this Court has expressly reserved to itself the
power to grant a new trial where the verdict is tainted
with passion and prejudice, it has many times avowed
its hesitancy in exercising that power or in any way
usurping the functions of the trial court or the jury and
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this Court has never exercised that power. In the Pauly
c.ase supra, it stated:
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is
well settled that this court has power to, and will,
consider assignments of error based on excessive
verdicts. But, although we have the power to
order a new trial in case of an excessive verdict,
it is a power which we have rarely, if ever, exercised. However, in the case of Shep.ard v. Payne,
supra, we ordered a remission of $2,500 from a
$10,000 verdict. In that case, the excess was not
the result of passion or prejudice, but was determinable as a matter of law.
"Where we can say, as .a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a
motion for new trial, we may order the verdict
set aside and a new trial granted. Jensen v.
Denver & R.G. R. Co., supra; and other cases
cited above following that decision. But mere
excessiveness of a verdict without more, does
not necessarilY show that the verdict was arrived
at by passim~ or prejudice. Stephens R.anch &
Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra. It is
true that the verdict might be so grossly excessive
and disproportionate to the injury that we could
say from that fact alone that as a matter of law
the verdict must have been arrived at by passion
or prejudice. But the farts must be such that the
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury.
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~1:cAfee v .. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra;
Ward v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., supra. This is
not such a case.

* * * *
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The
present cost of living and the diminishing purchasing power of the dollar may be taken into
consideration when estimating damages. Coke v.
Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra."
This Court has also laid down the requirement·s
which will justify the trial court in granting a new trial
in Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 44 Utah 100,
138 Pac. 1185 :
"Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new
trial on motion of the .aggrieved party may be
granted by the court below on the ground of 'excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.' Whenever that is made to appear, the court, when its
action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the verdict aside and grant a new
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that,
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law
by which the damages were to be regulated, or
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous
or outr.ageous or unjust as to be attributable to.
neither the charge nor the evidence, but only to
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passion or prejudice. Whether a new trial should
or should not be granted on this ground, of necessity, must largely rest within the sound discretion
of the trial court."
For two excellent statements of the principles which
should govern the trial court in exercising its discretion
see Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 and
Werthan Bag Corporation v. Agneu·, 202 F. 2d 119.
The Supreme Court can then only review the ruling
of the trial court on the basis that the trial court has
abused its discretion. This, again, is clearly pointed out
in the Jensen case where it is stated:
"Still that court, in such particular, is not
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged .abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exercise of power in such respect. Such a
review is not a review of a question of fact, but
of law. A ruling granting or refusing a motion
for a new trial is certainly reviewable when the
proceedings with respect to it are properly preserved and presented. That has not been questioned. Of course the ruling will not be disturbed
on evidence in conflict or on n1atters involving
discretion. Yet our power to correct a plain abuse
of discretion or undo a Inere capricious or arbitranT exercise of power cannot be doubted."
Neither this Court nor the trial court should set its
opinion against the opinion of the jury which is the tribunal charged with the responsibility of returning
a verdict. To do so is to usurp its function. This is
pointed out in the Jensen case :
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"Neither is either party on that question entitled to the judgment of the court below in a case
of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to that,
are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment of the
jury. That is exclusively within their province.
Their power and discretion, when properly exercised and when they have been properly directed
as to the measure of damages and the mode of assessing it, n1ay not be interfered with merely because the court above or below may think the
amount rendered is too large, or even may think
it appears to be larger than the evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court, vacating a verdict and granting a new trial by merely setting up
his opinion or judgment against that of the jury,
but usurps judicial power and prostitutes the
constitutional trial by jury."
Defendant places great reliance upon Duffy v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 219 P. 2d 1080. It refers
to the major injury and excruciating pain suffered by
Duffy. Defendant is the same here .as there and in its
brief there it characterized Duffy's injuries as follows:
"We respectfully submit that if any reasonable person were asked to compare this ordeal
with the normal affairs which a common person
sustains in his every day life he could not but conclude that the pain and suffering so expressively
stated by Mr. Duffy was no greater than that
occasioned to any person on the removal of an
appendix and not much, if any, more serious than
an ordinary tonsilectomy."
Of course, Duffy did not experience the intensified
and concentrated mental suffering endured by plaintiff
here. Also plaintiff worried about his eye sight for ap-
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proximately eleven months to the time of trial and only
the week before had been bothered by a particle coming
from his eye. vV e submit that the damages here are
greater than those in the Duffy c.ase. Wheat v. Denver
& Rio Grande Western R. Co., (Utah) 250 P. 2d 932,
characterized the holding in the Duffy case as follows:
"Accurately analyzed, the view of the court
in the above cases was undoubtedly that the
award, while excessive, was not so grossly excessive as to taint and make invalid the whole verdict.''
Even in the case mainly relied on by defendant the
Court found the verdict was not tainted with passion or
prejudice.
The rule is stated in the vVheat case as follows:
"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so
grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages which could have fairly been awarded as
to make manifest that the verdict was so suffused
with passion and prejudice that the defendant
could not have had a fair trial on the issues, the
trial court should unconditionally grant a new
trial. * * * Xotwithstanding what was said therein,
we regard the true rule to be that if the verdict
is so excessive as to show that it 1nust have been
motivated by prejudice or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as anger, resentment,
indignation or some kindred emotion has so overcOine or distorted the jury's re·ason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, it should
be unconditionally set aside."
Defendant also relies on this 'Yheat case and makes
eomparison of the injuries of Wheat and of plaintiff.
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Again the injuries are entirely dissimilar and cannot
even be weighed on the same scales. Another proposition to be considered is the fact that the same trial judge
sat in both the Wheat and this case. He had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses and plaintiff.
The Wheat case was cited to him on the argument for a
new trial. In his judg1nent the money value of the dam.ages sustained by plaintiff was greater than Wheat's.
Then, too, in the Wheat case there was a charge made
that members of the jury were guilty of misconduct and
the Court may well have remitted to eliminate any implication of prejudice.
Comparison of verdicts gives little if any assistance.
The verdicls of necessity include different people, places,
dates, juries, courts, etc.
The courts have found no rule of thumb or mathematical formula with which to compute damages for
mental or physical pain. It of necessity must be left to
the sound discretion of the jury. The rule is stated in
15 Am. J ur. 621, Damages section 205:
"In actions sounding in damages merely,
where the law furnishes no legal rule for measuring them, the amount to be awarded rests largely
in the discretion of the jury, and with their verdict the courts are reluctant to interfere."
The authorities generally do not segregate the matter of pain and suffering in discussing general verdict
figures, but in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, courts have had occasion to review verdicts
containing specified amounts for pain and suffering in
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actions for wrongful death. In N oce v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 337 Mo. 689, 85 S.W. (2d) 637, an
aw.ard of $10,000 for three hours conscious pain and
suffering was held not to be excessive. Here the deceased
had been hit in the head by a "metal hub liner" which
had been thrown off a wheel of a railroad car. In Talbert v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 321 Mo. 1030, 15 S.W.
(2d) 762 (cer. den. 280 U.S. 567, 74 L. Ed. 621, 50S. Ct.
26) an award of $10,000.00 for one hour of pain and suffering was upheld. The legs and hips of the deceased
had been crushed. In St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Croft,
237 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 1160, 35 S. Ct. 704, $5,000.00 for
one-half hour of pain was upheld. In Stone v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 230 !Ech. 472, 202 N.\V. 1004, .a $4,000.00
award was upheld for four hours pain. In Payne v.
Shipler, 243 S.W. 538, the deceased lived seventeen hours
after the injury, $5,000.00 for pain endured \Yas awarded
and the award was upheld.
The deduction for contributory negligence is another item which here refutes the clailn of passion and
prejudice. The theory of defendant's contention is that
the jury was so i1npassioned either for plaintiff or against
defendant that it wanted to giYe plaintiff more than he
was entitled to. If this is so why would the jury reduce
the verdict in favor of defendant? This certainly is not
the .act of an unreasoning group of persons acting solely
frmn

pa~~ion

and prejudice. This should dispell any

thought that this was the n1otivating factor in rendering
the verdict.
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\V e submit that the verdict is not tainted with passion and prejudice and that a reversal and new trial
should not be awarded to defendant. This Court should
be able to look at this verdict and remain unshocked and
unshaken.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THA'T THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.

As indicated by the .authorities cited above and by
defendant the review by an appellate court of claimed
excessive damages is a limited one. The appellate court's
sole function is to determine whether the trial court has
abused its discretion in denying, in this case, defendant's
motion for .a new trial. This Court must find that the
trial court acted capriciously and arbitrarily in such
denial.
\Ve submit that under the evidence mentioned and
the authorities cited in Point I there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A REMITTITUR.

Under its Point III defendant suggests a reduction
of the verdict in the event the Court does not go for the
passion and prejudice point.
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We do not contend against the power of the Court
to reduce the verdict. It is settled law that it has such
power and this power it has exercised. But the question
is should it be exercised in a case like this one~ To what
figure should it be reduced and upon what basis will the
Court arrive at a figure~ Will it not be usurping the
functions of the jury and trial court~
Admitting the verdict is liberal that is not enough
to justify the Court in reducing it. The jury has voiced
its opinion. This Court should not merely set up its
opinion against that of the jury. Counsel for defendant
has not had the hardihood to suggest a figure to which
the verdict should be reduced and give his reasons and
basis for it.
Again we must call attention to. the evidence and
authorities set forth under Point I and submit that the
verdict is not excessive and it should not be disturbed.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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